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Profits in Subrogation: An Insurer's Claim to Be
More than Indemnified
"[Ilf the assured is not entitled to retain an excess against
the insurer, and the insurer . . is not entitled to receive the
excess from the assured, what happens to the excess?"l This question, posed by Lord Justice Megaw in L. Lucas Ltd. v. Export
is bred by the juxtaposition of
Credits Guarantee Depa~trnent,~
two subrogation rules. The right to subrogation, being in nature
like restitution, entitles the holder of the right only to reimbursement3and, under a contract of insurance, "the assured . . . shall
be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemnified. "'The confusion that distribution of windfall profits in subrogation has brought to American and English courts derives
from both the difficulty of the question and its rarity. Because
insurance agreements are contracts of indemnity, the issue of
which party is entitled to any possible excess once both insurer
and insured have been indemnified has seldom been litigated.
This Comment will evaluate a subrogee's right to recover
more than it paid to the subrogor. The purpose of subrogation and
insurance will be outlined, focusing on those few recent cases in
England and the United States dealing with the profit-insubrogation issue. Next, this Comment will examine the circumstances under which a windfall might accrue to the insurer and
the possible justifications and consequences of such a windfall
award. A flexible approach for courts confronted with allocating
a windfall in an equitable subrogation suit will then be proposed.
Finally, the implications of choosing a flexible approach to windfalls in subrogation will be contrasted with the view that the
windfall be awarded strictly to either the insured or the insurer.

.

11. PRINCIPLES
OF SUB ROGATION^
A. Subrogation as Restitution
When the condition upon which an insurance contract is
1. L. Lucas Ltd. v. Export Credits Guar. Dep't, [I9731 2 All E.R. 984,990-91 (C.A.),
reu'd on other grounds, [I9741 2 All E.R. 889 (H.L.).
2. Id.
3. See Memphis & L.R.R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S.287, 302 (1887).
4. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 386 (1883).
5. Subrogation has been defined as
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based occurs6and the insured is indemnified by the insurer for
his loss, the insured would retain a right of action against the
tortfeasor7 for his damages absent equitable subrogation. In this
situation two possibilities emerge,8both of which are undesirable:
(1) the insured brings an action against the tortfeasor, thereby
recovering twice for the loss,@or (2) the insured, having been
compensated by the insurer, does not bring an action against the
tortfeasor, thereby freeing the tortfeasor from responsibility for
his wrongful acts. By vesting the cause of action against the
wrongdoer in the insurer who paid for the loss, theoretically both
these undesirable results can be avoided, with neither the insured
nor the insurer recovering more than an indemnity a t the expense
of the other.1° Thus subrogation is a restitutionary measure, the
a right equitable in origin and enforceable in common law, whereby a nonvolunteer who has made payment to another party by reason of a debt for which he
is only secondarily responsible, takes over that party's rights and remedies
against the third party (ies) who is (are) primarily responsible for such debt.
R. HORN,SUBROGATION
IN INSURANCE
THEORY
AND PRACTICE
13-14 (1964).The term subrogation as used in this Comment will refer, except where otherwise noted, to legal or equitable
subrogation created by law as opposed to conventional subrogation created by contract.
While there generally is little distinction between legal and conventional subrogation, this
Comment deals with when profit may equitably accrue to a subrogee, and not when profit
CYCLOPEDIA
OF
must accrue through enforcement of a contractual right. See 16 G. COUCH,
INSURANCE
LAWfj 61:2 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966); Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of
Subrogation Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1973 INS. L.J. 573. For a concise analysis of
subrogation theory, see King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEX.
L.
REV.62 (1951).
6. An insurer's liability under a contract of insurance may be triggered by a variety
of circumstances, including the commission of a tort, a breach of contract, or bankruptcy.
7. For simplification, "tortfeasor" will be used throughout this Comment to refer
generally to the party liable to the insured.
8. See 16 G . COUCH,supra note 5, 8 61:18; Kimball & Davis, The Extension of
Insurance Subrogation, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 841, 841-42 (1962).
9. See also 5 J. JOYCE,THE LAWOF INSURANCE
8 3537 (2d ed. 1918); W. VANCE,
OF THE LAWOF INSURANCE
423 (1904): "If [the insured] were allowed to recover
HANDBOOK
the amount of his loss from the tortfeasor and also from the insurance company, his
misfortune would result in profit, rather than loss, and undoubtedly tend to greatly increase the number of such misfortunes."
10. See Memphis & L.R.R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1887) (emphasis in
original):
The right of subrogation is not founded on contract. It is a creature of
equity; is enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of substantial justice; and is independent of any contractual relations between the parties.
All that the appellees can, in good conscience, d e m a a j s r e i m b u ~ m e n t f g their outlay . . . . When relief to that extent is accorded, they will have no just
ground to complain . . .
In Memphis the Court limited the subrogee to six percent interest established by statute
as the rate when no rate was agreed upon; the subrogee had claimed it was entitled to
eight percent, which was the rate established by the contract between the subrogor and
the creditor.

.
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purpose for its creation being to prevent the unjust enrichment
of either the insured" or the tortfeasor.12

B. The Roblem of Windfalls
Because subrogation law was founded on the insurance principles of indemnification,13very few cases arise in which there is
a possibility of a profit. The cases that do address the issue of
whether an insurer can recover more than it paid on the subrogated claim generally fall into two categories: (1)cases in which
the insured is not fully compensated for his losses and the insurer,
nonetheless, sues the tortfeasor for the full amount of the insured's injury; and (2) cases in which the insured is fully compensated and the insurer recovers from the tortfeasor more than the
amount of the insured's injury.
1.

Case of the first type: partial indemnification

Although the insured is not fully compensated where the
amount of the insurance policy is less than the value of the claim
insured, the insurer may claim that subrogation entitles him to
all of the remedies of the insured, including the right to recover
for the full amount of the injuries sustained. An example of this
11. See Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 386 (1883):
[Tlhis contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against which the
policy has been made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than
fully indemnified. That is the fundamental principle of insurance, and if ever a
proposition is brought forward which is at variance with it, that is to say, which
either will prevent the assured from obtaining a full indemnity, or which will
give the assured more than a full indemnity, that proposition must certainly be
wrong.
12. See American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Nat'l Bank, 33 F. Supp. 722,723 (E.D. Pa.),
rev'd, 116 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 314 U.S.314 (1941). Accord, Stafford Metal Works,
Inc. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("the wrongdoer
(tortfeasor) is not entitled to a windfall release from his obligation simply because the
injured party had the foresight to obtain insurance"); R. HORN,supra note 5, at 24 ("the
general purpose of subrogation is to facilitate placement of the financial consequences of
loss on the party primarily responsible in law for such loss").
13. See, e.g., Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0.Ry., 115 F.2d 277,
281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1940): "It follows that where the indemnity
feature is not present in the insurance contract
.the subrogation feature has no application"; 5 J. JOYCE,supra note 9, g 3537, at 5880: "We have already seen that . . .
insurance is a contract of indemnity, and it is for the purpose of carrying out this principle
that the doctrine of subrogation has been adopted"; Kimball & Davis, supra note 8, a t
849: "[S]ubrogation is justified by the indemnity character of the insurance contract, and
denial of subrogation must rest on the fact that the contract of insurance in question is
not gn indemnity contract."

..
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situation is the case of The Livingstone.14The insurer of a ship
which sunk in a collision with the Livingstone paid $25,000 on a
valued policy to the owners. The sunken ship was actually worth
$37,500, and this amount was recovered from the tortfeasor. After
the insurance company was paid $25,000, both the insurer and
the owners claimed the remaining $12,500. It was the insurer's
position that it was subrogated to all the rights of the owners,
while the owners insisted they were to be indemnified for their
uninsured loss. The Second Circuit, in awarding the $12,500 to
the insured, said that subrogation
does not permit one party to secure an unfair advantage over the
other; it does not permit the insurer to speculate, or profit or
drive an unconscionable bargain. When he is paid in full equity
requires the return of the balance to the insured in payment of
his uncompensated loss.

....
. . . [Elquity and good conscience do not require the court

to go further and permit [the insurer] to realize an enormous
profit from the transaction.15

This remedy clearly satisfies the principle of indemnification.
Proft to the insurance company could only have come at the
direct expense of the owners.16
2.

Cases of the second type: full indemnification

In the second type of case, both the insured and insurer have
been indemnified and there is the possibility of recovering additional funds. With the exception of cases where interest on the
award makes the amount recovered more than the actual loss,"
14. 130 F. 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904). Cf.D'Angelo v. Cornell
Paperboard Prods. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 390, 120 N.W.2d 70 (1963) (insurer paid insured
$120,000 in workmen's compensation, then attempted to recover $300,000 through subrogation).
15. 130 F. at 749, 751.
16. While cases of the first type emphasize that the insurer will not be able to recover
a profit if it deprives the insured of an indemnity, the convene is also true:
The general rule of law (and it is obvious justice) is that where there is a
contract of indemnity . . and a loss happens, anything which reduces or diminishes that loss reduces or diminishes the amount which the indemnifier is
bound to pay; and if the indemnifier has already paid it, then, if anything which
diminishes the loss comes into the hands of the person towhom he lias paid it,
it becomes an equity that the person who has already paid the full indemnity is
entitled to be recouped by having that amount back.
Burnand v. Rodocanachi Sons & Co., 7 App. Cas. 333,339 (1882), cited with approval in
Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S. 79, 88 (1891).
17. Although the addition of interest to the subrogee's award may make the award

.
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this situation is rare-so rare, in fact, that the issue was not
presented for judicial review until within the last few years.18
a. English decisions. lg The most prominent case, English or
American, considering the issues involved in denying or awarding
a windfall to an indemnified insurer is Yorkshire Insurance Co.
v. Nisbet Shipping Co.'O Yorkshire paid Nisbet for the loss of its
ship in a 1945 accident with a Canadian vessel. Yorkshire paid
Nisbet f72,000 under the policy, but the actual value of the ship
was around e75'514. In 1958when the Canadian Government, the
tortfeasor, finally paid the value of Nisbet's ship in dollars, the
pound had been devalued and the dollars were worth f126,971.
Both Yorkshire and Nisbet claimed the f 55,000 difference. Jus-

greater than the amount paid to the subrogor, many courts do not view the interest as an
extra award by way of damages, but rather as compensation for the use of money. See
Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1872): "Interest is the compensation allowed
by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forebearance of money, or as damages for its
detention . . . ."
Interest in some situations, however, may also be profit. In Glenn v. American Sur.
Co., 160 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1947) the court awarded interest to the surety on a contractor's
bond. The surety sought and was awarded interest on the amount paid on the bond. The
dissent stated: "While interest is not generally the equivalent of profit, it may become so
. . . . There are relatively few six percent investments in the portfolios of insurance
companies." Id. at 983.
18. There are many statements in reported opinions which would purportedly cover
the situation where both the insured and insurer have been indemnified and an excess
remains to be distributed. Typical of these is the dicta in The St. Johns, 101 F. 469,47475 (S.D.N.Y. 1900):
If the amount recoverable from the wrongdoer, after payment of the
damage-claims of third parties, were in excess of the amount paid by the underwriters to the assured, no doubt that excess would belong to the latter; since the
insurer's right of subrogation in equity could not extend beyond recoupment or
indemnity for the actual payments to the assured.
The statement clearly applies to cases where the insurer seeks to make a profit when the
insured has not been fully indemnified. See text accompanying notes 14-16supra. The law
simply has not had to confront directly the problem of distributing a profit between
subrogee and subrogor because, owing to the indemnifying nature of insurance, there has
not been a profit to distribute. An annotated statement similar to the dicta in The St.
Johns is made at 41 L.R.A. (n.8.) 720 note (1913), but not one of the cases cited deals with
a bona fide windfall. Similarly, no cases are cited in support of RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTIONQ 162, Comment i (1937): "[The surety] is entitled to be made whole, but
he is not entitled to make a profit." See also R. KEETON,BASICTwc~ON INSURANCE
LAW
160-62 (1971).
19. English maritime insurance cases are accorded respect in American courts to
preserve uniformity in interpretation and enforcement. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
340 U.S. 54, 59 (1950); Aetna Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304 U.S. 430, 438 (1938).
20. 119621 2 Q.B. 330. The court noted that this suit was the first recorded case
where the "quantum of the insurer's right of subrogation" has been questioned after
payment on a total loss (indemnification). Id. at 342. For a discussion of Yorkshire and
its implications for subrogation in England, see Hodgin, Subrogation in Insurance h w ,
1975 J . Bus. L. 114.
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tice Diplock carefully reviewed the major English subrogation
decisions as well as the decision in The LiuingstoneZ1and concluded that the insurance company was entitled only to the
amount it had paid the insured, f72,000. The court stated that
the rule it adopted "renders irrelevant any consideration of the
particular concatenation of circumstances which enable the assured to recover from the Canadian Government a sum in sterling
in excess of the value of the ship at the time of the c a s ~ a l t y . " ~
A later case commenting on Yorkshire, L. Lucas Ltd. v. Export Credits," found that all pounds must be treated the same,
without regard for the exchange rate or the purchasing power of
the pounds.24 According to this interpretation, the rule in
Yorkshire means that the subrogee may recover exactly what he
paid and nothing more-perhaps not even interest. Yorkshire
therefore seems to be inconsistent with the significant number of
other English cases in which interest has been awarded to the
subrogee.%
Yorkshire can perhaps also be criticized on another, more
fundamental ground. While a certain uneasiness about insurance
companies recovering a greater amount than they paid to the
insured can be appreciated, Yorkshire is one case in which payment of an excess to the insurer would have been justified by
principles basic to subrogation. By deciding that the insurance
company was entitled to only what it had paid, the court allowed
21. 130 F. 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904). Yorkshire only cited The
Livingstone in a footnote, but the passage tiom The St. Johns, note 18 supra, was quoted
in the text. [I9621 2 Q.B. a t 345-46.
22. [I9621 2 Q.B. a t 346.
23. [I9731 2 All E.R. 984 (C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, [I9741 2 All E.R. 889
(H.L.) (unanimous Court of Appeals reversed by unanimous decision of House of Lords
on the interpretation of a statutory subrogation clause).
24. The court said:
[A] pound is always a pound: so that whatever the exchange rates between the
pound and any or all other currencies, and whatever may happen between one
date and another to the internal purchasing power of the pound, in the eye of
the law a pound today is the same as it was yesterday or a year ago or ten years
ago . . . . If it were otherwise, I could see strong ground for the argument that
the guarantors were not fully indemnified by receiving in 1968the same number
of pounds as they had paid out in 1966. But as the law stands they must be
regarded as having been fully indemnified.
[I9731 2 All E.R. a t 989 (citing In Re United Rys. of the Havana & ReghWarehouses,
Ltd., [I9601 2 All E.R. 332, 356 (H.L.)).
25. H. Cousins & Co. v. D. & C. Carriers Ltd., [I9711 2 W.L.R. 85 (C.A.); In re
Miller, Gibb & Co., [I9571 1 W.L.R. 703 (Ch.); Parsons v. Briddock, 23 Eng. Rep. 997
(Ch. 1708). In Swain v. Wall, 21 Eng. Rep. 534, 535.(Ch. 1641), the court awarded 5100
to indemnify the surety and further awarded him 47 10s for "nine Months Damages."
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Nisbet Shipping to benefit from both the insurance and the tortfeasor's payment. Nisbet Shipping was paid f72,OOO in 1945 for
their ship. It had the use of those funds until 1958 when it collected an additional f55,000. The j55,000 is an excessive recovery-in contravention of one of the restitutionary purposes for
which subrogation was created-especially because the later
award did not reflect the interest that could have been earned on
the f 72,OOO paid in 1945.26In contrast, Yorkshire Insurance paid
f 7 2 , h in 1945 and recovered f 72,OOO in 1958; Yorkshire was not
even awarded interesten Nisbet Shipping was unjustly enriched
a t the expense bf Yorkshire I n s ~ r a n c e . ~ ~
b. U S . cases. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wilhoitz9
is a well-reasoned opinion in which a Kentucky court applied
basic subrogation principles in making an award of interest to an
insurer. The FDIC, as the insurer of an insolvent bank, reimbursed the depositors of the bank for their losses. The issue confronted by the court was whether the FDIC was entitled to interest on the amount paid the depositors of a commercial bank
several years before the resolution of the suit. The court held that
it was.30Had the court taken direction from The Livingstone or
Yorkshire and denied any award of interest, one of the basic
On the one
principles of subrogation would have been ~iolated.~'
hand, if the court had awarded the interest to the depositors
themselves, they would have received a double recovery of inter26. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
27. Interest is commonly awarded in subrogation cases in England. See note 25 supra.
28. The only solution which would have indemnified Yorbhire Insurance without
giving Nisbet Shipping a windfall profit would have been for the Canadian Government
to pay the equivalent of f72,000. But this solution would have relieved the Canadian
Government from full responsibility for the shipping accident. It would thus violate the
subrogation policy of holding the responsible party liable. See note 12 and accompanying
text supra.
29. 297 Ky. 339, 180 S.W.2d 72 (1943).
30. The court stated:
It is true that the equitable doctrine of subrogation is enforced solely for the
purpose of accomplishing the ends of substantial justice and that there is no
inexorable rule by which the right is to be measured. So a court of equity may
cut down or lessen rights of the subrogee, as by denying interest, or may even
bar subrogation altogether. However, generally the subrogee is placed in the
shoes or in the precise position of one to whose rights he is subrogated and is
entitled to all legal rights and remedies available to the creditor.
Id. at 348, 180 S.W.2d at 76.
Interest has commonly been awarded in Kentucky subrogation cases. E.g., Glenn v.
American Sur. Co., 160 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1947); Evan's Adm'r v. Evans, 304 Ky. 28,199
S.W.2d 734 (1947);Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487,192 S.W.2d 388 (1946).
31. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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est on their deposits because they had previously been indemnified by the FDIC with money that could have been invested or
deposited and drawing interest itself. On the other hand, if the
court had refused to award interest to either the depositors or the
FDIC, the result would have been tantamount to awarding the
interest to the insolvent bank because the bank would have had
the interest-free use of the FDIC's money.32
The issue of windfall or profit, other than interest, has been
raised in at least two decisions in the United States? The first is
Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. u. Local 612, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters." Carolina Casualty; having paid an
insurance claim on vehicles damaged in a union-management
dispute, sued the union for compensatory and punitive damages.
The court first noted that it was unable to find a case directly on
points and then dismissed the claim for punitive damages, citing
Corpus Juris Secundum for the general rule that subrogation
gives indemnity only.36The "indemnity only" rule is derived from
cases like The Livingstones7where the insurer only partially indemnified the insured; nevertheless, the court in Carolina
Casualty refused the claim without any discussion of the rule, its
origin, or its rationale.
In contrast to Carolina Casualty is the novel decision in
Urban Industries, Inc. v. Thevis? The court in that case held
that an insurance company subrogee may recover more than the
amount which it paid its subrogor. The defendant, Thevis, had
32. See also H. Cousins & Co. v. D. & C. Carriers Ltd., [I9711 2 W.L.R. 85 (C.A.).
33. Similar issues were raised in Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F.
Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976), and Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown,321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga.
1971). In Commercial Union the court dismissed a claim for punitive damages since
punitive damages are not recoverable in Louisiana. 409 F. Supp. at 68-59.
In Brown, the court cited GA. CODEANN. § 85-1805 (1970) which states: "A right of
action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property; but a right of
action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be
assigned." The court then cited Louisville & N.R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So. 306
(1909) to the effect that the right to punitive damages is not property. Also relied upon
for the rule that a subrogee is entitled to indemnity only were 83 C.J.S. Subrogation 6
14, at 614 (1953) and 50 AM. JUR. Subrogaton 8 119, a t 760 (1944).
Punitive damages were actually awarded to an insurance company where it was
understood that the funds would go to the insured's widow. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 250 Ala. 354, 34 So. 2d 474 (1948).
--- -- - 34. 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
35. "[Rlesearch has failed to reveal a case directly holding that an insurer or a surety
suing alone as a subrogee may recover punitive damages against a wrongdoer." Id. a t 943.
36. Id.
37. 130 F . 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904).
38. No. C 75-0342 L(A) (W.D. Ky. July 13, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3615 (6th
Cir. Nov. 7, 1978).
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hired two felons to burn the building of his competitor, Urban
Industries. Urban was indemnified for its property losses by four
insurance companies. Urban and the insurance companies
brought suit against Thevis; Urban suing for lost profits (for
which it had not been indemnified), the insurers suing on their
subrogation rights for the property losses. The jury awarded each
of the plaintiffs the compensatory damages claimed plus punitive
damages .3B
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in
the alternative, a new trial, the court ruled in favor of Urban
Industries and the insurance companies. The court relied on
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wilhoit40and refused the
Carolina Casualty rule.41According to the court, the opinion in
Wilhoit, which permitted an extra award (interest) to be paid the
subrogee, demonstrated that "Kentucky has no policy against the
recovery of damages over and above compensatory damages by a
subrogee."42
The Urban Industries decision is unique in several waysed3
First, a major windfall was awarded to the in~urers~~-a
result
examined and rejected by Carolina Casualty and Yorkshire. Second, the windfall was not awarded exclusively to the insurers;
both the insurers and the insured received excess funds-a possibility not even considered in Yorkshire. The remainder of this
Comment will examine the ground upon which the Urban
Industries decision might be based and the policy considerations
to be scrutinized before a rule favoring either the Urban
Industries or Yorkshire approach is adopted.
39. Each of the insurance companies was awarded 10 times its compensatory damages in punitive damages; Urban Industries was awarded slightly more than 57 times its
compensatory damages in punitive damages. Id. slip op. at 1.
40. 297 Ky. 339, 180 S.W.2d 72 (1943).
41. The court in Urban Industries did not cite Carolina Casualty, but it cited Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a decision based in part on
Carolina Casualty. See note 33 supra.
42. Urban Indus. Inc. v. Thevis, No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip op. a t 6.
43. The court noted that the questions presented were "interesting and novel" and
that "[tlhe case a t bar, insofar as it pertains to punitive damages, is and will probably
continue to be unique, for this Court knows of no instance where an insurance company
has been awarded punitive damages ad where its insured also has been awarded such
damages." Id. slip op. at 1, 6.
44. The total judgment against Thevis exceeded $675,000, $450,000 of which went to
the four insurance companies. Thevis, hardly judgment-proof, is the president of Global
Industries, which operates an "empire" of X-rated theaters and "adult" bookstores. His
Sept.
empire has been valued at $100 million. See Cook, The X-Rated Economy, FORBES,
18, 1978, at 81. NEWSWEEK,
May 29, 1978, a t 30; TIME, May 29, 1978, at 25.
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A. Subrogation as Cession of Property
At Roman law subrogation meant the literal substitution of
one party for another.45At common law when the insurer paid the
debt of the insured, the insured ceded his rights in the action to
the insurer. The insurer or subrogee was therefore entitled to
precisely the same rights, claims, and defenses of the insured.46
The idea of cession was evident in the Urban Industries decision;
the court noted that an insurance company "becomes subrogated
to any claim for the same damages which the insured might have
recovered.''47
45. In Roman law subrogation meant that one official's actions replaced another's
actions. The doctrine was called cessio actionum. The transference of rights required a
positive action and could be lost through inaction. In contrast, in English law the cession
of property was a right automatically conferred by law when the insurer or surety paid
the debt of the insured. Marasinghe, An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Early History of the Doctrine I, 10 VAL.U.L. REV. 45, 45-46, 50 (1976).
Subrogation, as cession of property, is similar to assignment, although the two have
been distinguished on the grounds that assignment is merely a contractual transfer of
& J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE
LAWAND PRACTICE§ 4053 (1972)
rights. See 6A J.A. APPLEMAN
(subrogation is substitution for a party; assignment is a transfer of rights); 16 G. COUCH,
supra note 5, 8 61:92 (subrogation is an act of the law; assignment is a voluntary act of
the parties).
This distinction between subrogation and assignment may favor the argument that
even though a claim for punitive damages generally may not be assigned, see, e.g., People
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283,507 P.2d 1400,107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); Dugar v. Happy
Tiger Records, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 812, 116 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1974); French v. Orange
County Inv. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 587, 13 P.2d 1046 (1932); contra, Dunshee v. Standard
Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830 (1914), allowing a subrogee to recover punitive
damages may be justified since the right of subrogation is generally preferred to a claim
by assignment, see, e.g., Hardaway v. National Sur. Co., 211 U.S. 552, 561 (1908);Prairie
State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 232 (1896).
46. The classic statement on English subrogaton law is Castellain v. P~keston,11
Q.B.D. 380 (1883). The court said:
[A]s between the underwriter and the assured the underwriter is entitled to the
advantage of every right of the assured, whether such right consists in contract,
fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted or already
insisted on, or in any other right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal
or equitable . . .
Id. a t 388.
47. No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip op. at 4. The court based this conclusion on a statement
in Bratton v. Speaks, 286 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Ky. 1956): "[The insurer] becomes subrogated to any claim for the same damages which the insured might have recovered from
-.- the wrongdoer causing the damages."
The right of an insurance company to collect literally anything the insured could have
recovered was upheld in North of Eng. Iron S.S. Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, L.R. 5 Q.B. 244
(1870). In Armstrong the policy stated that the value of the insured ship was $6000.When
the ship sunk the owner was paid the f6000 from the tortfeasor, but subsequently the
owner recovered f9000 from the tortfeasor, the actual value of the ship. The court stated:

.
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The notion of subrogation as substitution of one party for
another has had greater significance in the United States than in
England; this may explain why the Kentucky court in Urban
Industries was willing to allow an excess recovery while the English court in Yorkshire was not. In England, the subrogee must
maintain his action against the wrongdoer in the name of the
s ~ b r o g o r in
;~~
the United States, the majority rule is that the
subrogee must sue in his own name in deference to real-party-ininterest rules ."' n
Urban Industries, the. insurance companies
were by action of law the real parties in interest and seemed
entitled, conceptually a t least, to the windfall fruits of the
suit-punitive damages.

.

[Ilf a party chooses to have his vessel or his goods . . taken a t a fixed value,
instead of leaving the contract, as in an ordinary policy, simply one of indemnity
to the extent of the real value, and if thereby any benefit accrues to the underwriters, the underwriters must be entitlted to it.
Id. at 250. Armstrong was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in The Potomac,
105 U S . 630, 635 (1881), but was repudiated in Aetna Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304
US. 430 (1938): "[Ilt would in some cases deprive the insured of indemnity, and indeed
might enable the insurer to make a profit by recovering more from the insured than the
amounts paid on the policy. We are unable to sanction a doctrine involving such consequences." Id. a t 436.
Various attempts have been made to distinguish Armstrong. In Thames & Mersey
Marine Ins. Co. v. British & Chilian S.S. Co., [I9151 2 K.B. 214, aff'd, [I9161 1 K.B.
30 (C.A.), the court commented on Armstrong but dismissed the passage as dicta. The
court in Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [I9621 2 Q.B. 330, cited Glen Line,
Ltd. v. Attorney-General, 46 T.L.R. 451 (H.L. 1930), to show that Armstrong had not
properly distinguished between subrogation and abandonment. Yorkshire held that, in
any case, Armstrong was in conflict with Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883), the
"locus classicus of subrogation in insurance." [I9621 2 Q.B. a t 343. See 10 J. ATWOULD,
BRITISHSHIPPING
LAWS:THELAWOF MARINEINSURANCE AND AVERAGE
1[ 1219 (1961).
In subrogation the subrogee is entitled to the rights and remedies of the subrogor while
in abandonment the subrogee is entitled to the actual property insured. 10 J. ARNOULD,
Supra 1216; R. GOFF& G . JONES,THE LAW OF RESTITUTION388 (1966); 25 HALSBURY'S
LAWSOF ENGLAND
1[ 332 (4th ed. 1978).
48. simpson & Co. v. Thomson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
49. It was felt the insured would become indifferent once the claim was paid, so the
OUTLINE
OF THE LAWOF ~ S U R A N C E
insurer was allowed to sue in his own name. L. DONAHUE,
65 (1927). In Kentucky the subrogee must bring the action in his own name as the real
party in interest. KY.R. CT. 17.01. See Monson v. Payne, 199 Ky. 105,250 S.W. 798 (1923);
Bryan v. Henderson Elec. Co., 566 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
A similar rule is used in the federal courts. FED.R. CIV.P. 17(a). See also United
States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (subrogated insurer is real party in
interest); National Garment v. New York C. & St. L.R.R., 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949)
(insurer partially subrogated may sue in own name). Cf. United States Merchants' &
Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line, 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933)
(citizenship of subrogee used in determining diversity jurisdiction).
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B. The Insurer's Interest
One of the justifications given for the punitive award to the
insurers in Urban Industries was the expense incurred by the
insurance companies in investigating and pursuing their claim.50
If the insurance companies had sought and been awarded recovery for their own expenses directly, the suit would have been, in
form, an action in tort. That is, the insurers would have been
recovering under an independent, nonderivative right to sue the
tortfeasor. Although it has been weakly suggested that an insurer
may obtain to some independent rights by virtue of a property
~ l possibility of other nonderivative
interest in the insured r e ~ ,the
insurers' rights has never been confronted. This is probably because resort to such a rationale is not necessary or prudent. In
most cases, the right of subrogation is sufficient to protect the
interests of the insurers, although good cause might be shown in
rare cases for awarding insurance companies the costs of investigating and processing a claim. An award of interest or attorneys'
fees might be even more appropriate.

C. Equitable Su brogation Principles
The value of Urban Industries lies not so much in the justification given by the court, but rather in the result and in the
rationale that could have been given. The jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages to the subrogees in the case had
a certain intrinsic appeal, and it did not offend the basic objectives of subrogation law-it indemnified both the insured and the
insurers and held the tortfeasor responsible. But, before the rule
can become valid law, there must be a legal justification. Because
subrogation is an equitable notion, the flexibility inherent in eq50. No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip. op. at 5.
51. In London Assurance Co. v. Sainsbury, 99 Eng. Rep. 636,640 (K.B.
1783),Justice
Willes stated:
I admit that a man cannot transfer his right to a chose in action; but if the
insurer had an original right, he may elect to sue in his own name or in that of
the insured. . . . This is not like a wager; it is an insurance on the house, and
gives an interest in it.
The idea that the insurer took a cestui's interest in the property insured was never
adopted; it was repudiated in Simpson v. Thomson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877), because under
that rule almost anyone having a relationship with the insuerd could clacm some injury.
The resulting suits against the tortfeasor "might be both numerous and novel." Id. a t 290.
It could also be hypothesized that if the insured negligently damaged his property, the
insurer, by virtue of his cestui's interest, would have a defense against the insured, thus
canceling the insurance policy.
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uitable actions justifies the desirable result reached.52
The equitable notion of subrogation embraces a concept consistent with the purpose for punitive damages-holding the tortfeasor responsible for his actions. Inherent in an award of punitive
damages is the idea of civil punishment. If punitive damages are
a deterrent and a punishment," from society's point of view the
~
identity of the party collecting the award is ~ n i m p o r t a n tIf. ~the
court in Urban Industries can be criticized for administering subrogation by principles of "natural justice,". the alternative of not
permitting the punitive damages might have unjustly enriched
the tortfeasor.

IV. REPERCUSSIONS
OF A FLEXIBLE
APPROACH
Opting for a flexible rather than a rigid rule regarding who
can and who cannot recover any excesses in a subrogation case
presents some questions which are worthy of consideration, especially because in the wake of Urban Industries it is reasonable to
52. The court stated in Flannary v. Utley, 3 S.W. 412, 413 (Ky. 1887):
Subrogation is a creation of equity, born of the civil law. Its object is to secure
essential justice, without regard to form. Being of purely equitable origin, it is
always controlled by equitable principles; and, as between a principal and his
sureties, has been applied much more extensively in the American than in
English jurisprudence. We do not mean to say, however, that its application is
controlled alone by the chancellor's conception of right. The doctrine cannot be
applied . . . where it will work injustice to the rights of others.
See also National Sur. Corp. v. Allen-Codell Co., 70 F. Supp. 189, 192 (E.D. Ky. 1947);
Evans' Adm'r v. Evans, 304 Ky. 28, 32, 199 S.W.2d 734, 737 (1947); Western Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 492-93, 192 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (1946).
53. In early Kentucky decisions punitive damages were intended not only as punishment, but also as compensation for the plaintiff. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148
Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roth, 130 Ky. 759, 114 S.W. 264
(1908); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859). Gradually, the courts have come to
view punitive damages more as punishment than compensation. Hensley v. Paul Miller
Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974); Ashland' Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577,
195 S.W.2d 312 (1946).
Punitive damages need not bear a relationship to the compensatory award but must
bear a relationship to the injury. Kidd v. Burlew, 407 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1969); Flame Coal
Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962). In Kentucky
recovery of compensatory damages is not necessarily a prerequisite to support a punitive
damages claim. See Maddix v. Gammon, 293 Ky. 540, 169 S.W.2d 594 (1943); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912).
54. See Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640, 646-48 (D. Del. 1970) (plaintiff indirectly
injured awarded exemplary damages). Cf. Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283, 1285
(Okla. 1976) (punitive damages awarded not to compensate victim, but to deter similar
conduct). But see French v. Orange County Inv. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 587, 591, 13 P.2d
1046, 1048 (1932) (punitive damages awarded only to party immediately injured); Hughey
v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 154 S.E.2d 839 (1967) (remote victim of tort cannot recover
punitive damages).
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expect that insurance companies will demand rights to punitive
damages and statutory penalties.
A flexible approach can only be taken a t the cost of some
certainty in the law, but this cost is small when compared to the
alternative risks. If Yorkshire were the rule,55then the insured
would always recover any excess resulting from the suit, no matter who brings it, and the insured might benefit without incurring
the costs of litigati~n.~" the insured must recover all excesses
and the potential extra award is in the form of punitive damages,
the insurer might not be able to raise the issue in the pleadings
unless the insured either joined the action or brought a separate
suit. There would be additional complications in those states
where the insured could not bring his own suit for punitive damages because they cannot be awarded without an award of compensatory damage^.^' In such situations the tortfeasor could escape civil responsibility for his action." On the other hand, if
there were a fixed rule that all excesses belonged to the insurer,
then the insured, who was directly injured, would be denied any
benefit resulting from the award of punitive damages. This might
encourage the insured to forego the insurance in hopes of getting
55. While Yorkshire dealt with an excess resulting from changes in an exchange rate,
Justice Diplock in Yorkshire clearly contemplated the possibility that an insurer would
claim punitive damages. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [I9621 2 Q.B. 330,
334.
56. In Yorkshire the insurance company initially bore all of the costs of litigation
against the Canadian Government, although the court said:
By agreement between the parties I can ignore for the purposes of this judgment
the costs incurred in the litigation between the assured and the Canadian Government. They have agreed between themselves as to the way in which these
will be dealt with, depending upon the ultimate decision in this action upon the
question of principle involved.
Id. at 338. Presumably, under less amicable circumstances the insurance company might
be responsible for all of the litigation expenses even though the insured ultimately collected the windfall.
57. See, e.g., Gomez v. Dykes, 89 Ariz. 171, 359 P.2d 760 (1961); Contractor's Safety
Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957); Hilbert v.
Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). In a t least one jurisdicton the recovery of punitive
damages alone may be barred by statute. Eckels v. Traverse, 362 P.2d 680, 683 (Okla.
1961) (construing OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 29, 4 9 (West 1951) to mean that actual damages
must be recoverable before punitive damages may be awarded).
58. This could be the ultimate result of the decision in Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Local
612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956). See text accompanying
notes 34-37 supra. If the insured in Carolina Casualty did nottxing a mbsequentzxtion
for punitive damages, and the insurer was not permiited to collect punitive damages, the
tortfeasor escaped without being punished for the malicious and deliberate nature of the
tortious act. But even where the insured can bring a suit for punitive damages, there may
be little incentive to join costly and time-consuming litigation in hopes of securing such
damages. See DONAHUE,
supm note 49.

1451

PROFITS IN SUBROGATION

159

both compensatory and punitive damages,5Bwhich defeats the
purpose for having the insurance.
Unfortunately, little is known about what effect larger subrogation recoveries might have on the behavior of insurance companies." A recovery of extra damages might encourage insurers to
speculate by insuring businesses with high tort risks, compensating for the risk through the subrogation profits." With the movement toward insuring against punitive damages claims," allowing
insurance companies to collect punitive damages might have little or no deterrent effect on the tortfeasor since the payment of
punitive damages would constitute a transfer of funds between
insurers. This would frustrate one of the purposes of subrogation
by relieving the guilty party of the duty to pay for the egregious
act. Finally, if insurers are permitted profit through a flexible
subrogation rule, then the insurers should be forced to disgorge
the benefits of the premiums either in the lawsuit settlement or
through lower future rates." Since the potential for an increase
59. See, e.g., Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N.Y.273,146 N.E.377
(1925) (under then-existing law the insured was required to elect a remedy; he had to
either collect workmen's compensation or sue the negligent party).
60. Horn states that little information is available on the effect of subrogation on the
insurance industry; thus subrogation's impact is speculative. R. HORN,supra note 5, a t
146.
61. Speculation was one of the evils which subrogation was meant to avoid. See
Procaccia, supm note 5, at 575.
62. See Levit, finitive Damages: Recent Developments, 1977 INS. L.J. 719.
63. Unless some allowance were made, the insurer would have the benefits of the
premiums and the subrogation award. It would seem proper in such a situation to force
insurers to disgorge the benefits of past premiums. There is, however, no direct authority
for such a proposition. The Arizona Supreme Court opined that lower premiums generally
do not result from subrogation. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 118 Ariz. 301, 576 P.2d 489
(1978). Patterson notes that "[s]ubrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part
in rate schedules (or only a minor one), and no reduction is made in insuring interests
. . . ." E. PATTERSON,ESSENTIALS
OF INSURANCE LAW 151-52 (1957). At least one court has
held that insurers need not disgorge the benefits of past premiums:
It is objected that such a recovery by the surety constitutes a "windfall" in that
in the event of such recovery the surety suffers no loss on its surety bond although it has been paid premiums by the insured to reimburse it against just
such a loss, as here. This argument loses sight of two fundamental facts: first,
that even if the surety recovers against the third party on subrogation it still
has been put to the expense of paying agent's commissions . . . [,I investigating the insured's claim and . . . settling or litigating it, and, second, that the
amounts of recoveries by subrogation are taken into consideration in arriving at
the amount of premiums to be charged for surety bonds.
Standard Accident Ins. v. Pellechia, 15 N.J. 162, 188, 104 A.2d 288, 302 (1954).
If subrogation has not been used in fixing rate schedules, it may be because recoveries
under subrogaton clauses comprise a very small percentage of claims actually paid. For
example, in 1972 insurance companies paid $973,636,000 in fire claims but recovered
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in subrogation litigation is great, further consideration by the
courts, the legislatures, and the insurance companies themselves
would be useful.

In adopting a rule on excess awards in subrogation, first consideration must be given to the insured. Although contrary holdings have been made, most courts have correctly sought to indemnify the insured first. After indemnifying the insured, consideration should then be given to reimbursing the insurer. A policy
which ignores these rules must be at variance with the purpose
for either insurance or subrogation. Once both insured and insurer have been indemnified, the court should be flexible in its
award of any excess. Although in most cases the excess will naturally belong to the insured, the lesson to be learned from
Yorkshire is that there are circumstances in which the insurer
may deserve at least part of the excess. The Urban Industries
decision stands for the proposition that as long as the insured is
indemnified, the courts should be free to adjust the equities
among the insured, insurer, and tortfeasor. On the basis of equitable subrogation principles, there should be no absolute proscription of a windfall recovery by an insurer.
Jay S. By bee
through subrogation only $6,621,000 or .68% of the losses paid.-Meyers, Subrogation
Rights and Recoveries Arising out of First Party Contracts, 9 FORUM83, 84-85 (1973).

